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Myers v. United States1 is perhaps the leading Supreme Court case
on the law of presidential power. The decision invalidated an 1872 law
that required senatorial consent to the removal of local postmasters.
Despite the seeming triviality of the office at issue, Myers clearly was
a “great case.” It was argued twice in the Court, the second time with
Senator George Wharton Pepper appearing on behalf of Congress.2
Chief Justice Taft’s expansive opinion was not confined to the postmaster issue but went on to conclude that the Constitution gives the
President unfettered power to remove nonjudicial appointees. These
officials exercise executive power on behalf of the President, who must
have implicit faith in their loyalty and trustworthiness.3 This reasoning
†

Associate Dean for Academic Affairs (School of Law), David L. Brennan
Professor of Law, and Professor of Political Science, Case Western Reserve
University. Special thanks to the staff of the Oregon Historical Society,
who granted me access to the Frank Myers Papers. Thanks also to the
editors of the Case Western Reserve Law Review for allowing me to
present this Article at the symposium. Earlier versions were presented at
the American Political Science Association annual meeting and at a
faculty workshop at Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
Thanks to participants at all of these presentations for helpful suggestions.
All remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the author.

1.

272 U.S. 52 (1926).

2.

Id. at 56.

3.

See id. at 117 (“As he is charged specifically to take care that [the laws]
be faithfully executed, the reasonable implication . . . was that as part of
his executive power he should select those who were to act for him under
his direction in the execution of the laws.”).
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led to the conclusion that the Tenure of Office Act,4 which precipitated
the impeachment of Andrew Johnson and served as the model for the
postmaster statute, was also unconstitutional.5 Taft reached that bigger
issue even though the Tenure of Office Act had been repealed almost
forty years earlier.6
Myers initially was viewed as a sweeping endorsement of executive
power, and in recent times its reasoning has been invoked as a vital
precedent by adherents of the so-called unitary executive. But Myers
has not always been so understood either by the bench or by the
academy. The Court soon retreated from Chief Justice Taft’s broad
language and has not embraced the full implications of the Myers
approach despite impassioned urging by judicial and academic
advocates of the unitary executive theory. Nearly half a century later,
nobody involved in the Watergate tapes case, United States v. Nixon,7
noticed that the regulation which created the position of special prosecutor was inconsistent with Myers, and even Justice Scalia, the Court’s
most outspoken proponent of the unitary executive, overlooked the
problem in one of his most impassioned dissenting opinions.
So Myers remains an important decision, but there are many
perplexing aspects to it. For one thing, it has never been very clear why
Frank Myers was removed from his position. Chief Justice Rehnquist
has suggested that Myers might have “committed fraud in the course
of his official duties” but cited no authority for this suspicion.8 If Myers
had been engaged in illegal or unethical activities, however, the
administration almost certainly could have obtained the necessary
senatorial consent to his ouster. That raises questions about why
President Wilson transformed what appears to have been a minor
personnel matter into a constitutional confrontation. In addition, Taft’s
majority opinion in Myers went well beyond what was necessary to
resolve the case and ignored the position advanced by the solicitor
general in support of Wilson’s action.9 The traditional jurisprudential
preference for narrow decisions makes the breadth of the Myers opinion
something of an anomaly that is worthy of explanation. Finally,
4.

Ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867), amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1869, ch. 10, 16
Stat. 6.

5.

See Myers, 272 U.S. at 176 (reasoning that “it . . . follows that the Tenure
of Office Act . . . was invalid”).

6.

Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500.

7.

418 U.S. 683 (1974).

8.

Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 827 (1997); see also William H.
Rehnquist, Grand Inquests 262 (1992) (noting that Myers was investigated for unspecified “irregularities in the management of the Portland
post office”).

9.

See Myers, 272 U.S. at 90 (argument of Solicitor General Beck)
(suggesting that “[i]t is not necessary in this case to determine the full
question as to this removal power”).
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perceptions of the Myers ruling have fluctuated over the years,
suggesting the need to put the case into broader context.
This Article seeks to provide at least tentative answers to some of
these questions. Part I outlines the facts leading to the lawsuit. Then
Part II considers several possible explanations for why the Wilson
administration might have forced the constitutional issue. Next, Part
III examines Taft’s position both as Chief Justice and as President in
order to assess the widespread suggestion that his experience in both
offices prompted him to write so expansively. Finally, Part IV explores
the changing view of Myers both as a precedent and as a symbol of
presidential power.

I. FRANK MYERS
President Wilson appointed Frank Myers as postmaster of
Portland, Oregon, for a four-year term in April 1913.10 Myers, then
thirty-seven years old, had been active in Democratic politics in the
state, most recently as an aide to U.S. Senator Harry Lane. Lane, the
grandson of Oregon’s first territorial governor and a Columbiaeducated physician, served as superintendent of the state mental hospital, held leadership positions in the medical profession, sat on the
state board of health, and in 1905 was elected to the first of his two
terms as a reformist mayor of Portland.11 Myers managed Lane’s 1912
campaign for the Senate and went to Washington to serve as his
personal secretary before becoming postmaster.12
10.

Myers was nominated on April 15, see 50 Cong. Rec. 199 (1913), and
confirmed and commissioned on April 24, see id. at 391; Power of the
President to Remove Federal Officers, S. Doc. No. 69-174, at 12
(1926).

11.

See Robert E. Burton, Democrats of Oregon 33 (1970); Gordon
B. Dodds, The American Northwest 191–93 (1986) [hereinafter
Dodds, American Northwest]; Gordon B. Dodds, Oregon: A
Bicentennial History 173 (1977) [hereinafter Dodds, Oregon] (noting that Lane “reformed the police department and refused to create needless jobs for patronage plums”).

12.

See Ex-Postmaster F.S. Myers Dies, Oregon J., Dec. 24, 1924, at 1
(“Through the management of the campaign of former United States
Senator Harry Lane and subsequent service as private secretary to the
senator, Myers first became prominent in political life of the state.”); F.S.
Myers, Ex-Postal Chief, Dies, Portland Telegram, Dec. 24, 1924, at 1
(noting that Myers “emerged into national politics in 1912 as a member
of the campaign committee for the late Senator Lane”); Frank S. Myers
Is Dead, Portland Oregonian, Dec. 25, 1924, at 9 (“In 1912 [Myers]
acted as secretary for the late Senator Lane, after having been his
campaign manager.”). Although Lane’s election to the Senate antedated
the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for direct
election to the upper chamber, Oregon reformers had succeeded in
enacting a measure under which members of the state legislature could
commit themselves to voting for the candidate receiving the most votes
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His appointment was greeted enthusiastically. Local newspapers
ran prominent stories marking the new man’s arrival and noting his
commitment to obtaining larger quarters for the overcrowded local post
office.13 Things seem to have gone uneventfully for Myers during his
first term. He remained involved in politics, especially in connection
with federal patronage matters.14 Except for a minor dispute over the
delayed seating of Oregon’s newly elected member of the Democratic
National Committee in 1915, Myers generally managed to avoid
controversy.15 Wilson nominated Myers for a second four-year term in
July 1917, and the Senate confirmed two days later.16
Myers’s second term was much more contentious than his first. In
the spring of 1919 he became involved in yet another crisis over the
state’s national committeeman. This time the split was more serious,
with the state party’s executive deadlocked between factions loyal to
President Wilson and to Senator George Chamberlain, who had been
sharply critical of Wilson’s military preparedness policies.17 Myers
weighed in strongly on the Wilson loyalist side and was widely rumored
to be contemplating a primary run against Chamberlain the following
in a nonbinding general election contest. See Burton, supra note 11, at
28; Dodds, Oregon, supra note 11, at 169–70; Russell G. Hendricks,
Election of Senator Chamberlain, The People’s Choice, 53 Or. Hist. Q.
63, 65 (1952).
13.

New Postmaster Arrives, Oregon J., May 7, 1913, at 1; New Postmaster
Is In Charge Today, Portland Telegram, May 7, 1913, at 2.

14.

Myers’s papers include a substantial correspondence with aspirants for
federal appointments and many letters to both his mentor, Lane, and
Oregon’s senior senator, George Chamberlain, about patronage matters.
His focus was not confined to Oregon appointments. See, e.g., Letter from
Frank S. Myers to Senator George E. Chamberlain (Aug. 1, 1913)
(regarding appointment of James Coffey as Collector of Internal Revenue
in South Dakota).

15.

See Letter from Frank S. Myers to Hon. A. Mitchell Palmer (Mar. 25,
1915) (noting that “for some unknown and unexplainable reason the
National Chairman refuses to recognize [the newly elected committee
member]”); Letter from Frank S. Myers to Hon. Joseph Tumulty (Dec. 1,
1915) (noting the unpopularity of the holdover committeeman in Oregon).
Ironically, the holdover committeeman whose replacement Myers
supported was Will R. King, who would later represent him in his lawsuit
challenging his dismissal as postmaster. See Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 56 (1926).

16.

See 55 Cong. Rec. 5288 (1917); id. at 5375.

17.

See Democrats in Row for State Control, Portland Oregonian, Apr.
20, 1919, at 23; Political Row Near Crux, Portland Oregonian, May
19, 1920, at 20; see generally Sheldon Bernard Avery, A Private Civil
War: The Controversy Between George E. Chamberlain and Woodrow
Wilson (June 1967) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Oregon) (on
file with author). For further discussion of Chamberlain’s position, see
infra notes 44–49 and accompanying text.
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year.18 The Chamberlain faction hit back by excluding Myers from a
private dinner held for Secretary of War Newton D. Baker.19
Meanwhile, Myers got into a nasty public spat with Congressman
Clifton McArthur, a Portland Republican who took to the House floor
to denounce Myers as a “liar” for telling an interviewer that the congressman had gone to Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson with a
“crooked scheme.” Myers denied making the statements and claimed
that the candidates he had supported against McArthur had never
“been guilty of selling the remnant of a tubercular herd of cattle to
Multnomah county.”20
Later in the year, Myers asked the Post Office Department to investigate his assistant, Harry Durand. The reason for the investigation
was not clear, although press reports suggested that Myers suspected
Durand of harboring Republican sympathies and of personal disloyalty.
The postal inspectors ultimately gave Durand a clean bill of health but
then turned their attention to Myers.21 He was said to run the Portland
post office in a high-handed, dictatorial, and manipulative fashion that
alienated workers, customers, and all but a handful of local Democratic
activists.22
Within days of the first newspaper accounts of the investigation,
Myers found himself the target of additional criticism. Portland Mayor
George L. Baker, a Republican and staunch war hawk,23 presented
18.

See, e.g., Letter from Frank S. Myers to Hon. J.P. Tumulty (May 20,
1919) (urging DNC to refuse to recognize the Chamberlain faction’s
representative); Rumor Says Myers Seeks Senatorship, Portland
Oregonian, Apr. 9, 1919, at 9; Rumored Candidacy of F.S. Myers Stirs,
Portland Oregonian, Apr. 10, 1919, at 16; Myers Won’t Deny He May
Seek Toga, Portland Oregonian, Apr. 23, 1919, at 13. Myers
ultimately chose not to make the race but actively supported
Chamberlain’s primary opponent. See Avery, supra note 17, at 92 n.19.

19.

See Chamberlain Crowd Hit Hard at Myers, Portland Oregonian, Mar.
19, 1919, at 12 (quoting one of the dinner organizers as saying, “[t]here
were some people we didn’t want at the dinner and so we didn’t invite
them. . . . I might even go so far as to mention Myers”).

20.

M’Arthur Flays Frank S. Myers, Oregon J., Mar. 4, 1919, at 5; Myers’
Attack Resented, Portland Oregonian, Mar. 4, 1919, at 8; Myers
Replies to Attack, Portland Oregonian, Mar. 5, 1919, at 3.

21.

See Myers Loses Fight Against Durand, Portland Oregonian, June 5,
1919, at 4 (“It appears that there is not fault to be found with . . . Mr.
Durand.”).

22.

See Democrats Pleased at Postal Inquiry, Portland Oregonian, July
31, 1919, at 4 (“Hardly one person . . . has seen fit to commend the official
administration of Mr. Myers.”); Postoffice Inquiry of Interest to All,
Portland Oregonian, Aug. 1, 1919, at 9 (“The record of Mr. Myers is
remarkable, according to [employees]. They say that he has caused more
inefficiency in the local office than has ever before existed.”).

23.

See E. Kimbark MacColl, The Growth of a City 140–43 (1979).
Mayor Baker was instrumental in forcing the resignation of a librarian
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public charges implying that Myers was not fully supportive of U.S.
involvement in the recently ended First World War. A number of
returning servicemen claimed that the postmaster had refused to give
them their old jobs, and the mayor took up their cause.24 Myers
responded in his typically diplomatic fashion, describing Baker as “four
flushing” and “weak minded” while strenuously denying the charges.25
Soon the local American Legion began investigating the postmaster’s
alleged mistreatment of World War I veterans; within a month, Myers
backed down and restored the returnees to their prewar positions.26
Although this flap was technically separate from the Post Office
Department’s investigation, it certainly contributed to public perception that Myers would have to go.27
Ultimately the Post Office Department demanded that Myers resign effective January 31, 1920. The letter demanding his resignation
explained that the previous year’s investigation had sought to
“eliminate the antagonism which existed in the Portland office and
bring about needed cooperation” but that this had not happened,
leaving Washington no alternative but to remove both Myers and
Durand.28 Myers did not go quietly, denying that he could be removed
without the Senate’s consent and demanding a hearing on the charges
who refused to buy war bonds although she claimed to support American
participation in World War I. See id. at 149–52.
24.

See War Veterans Turn Guns on Postmaster, Portland Oregonian,
Aug. 2, 1919, at 12 (“Failure to give ex-service men former positions in
the Portland post-office . . . form the principal charges against Postmaster
Frank S. Myers.”); Mayor Dares Myers to Deny Accusations, Portland
Oregonian, Aug. 3, 1919, at 21.

25.

Mayor Baker Four Flusher, Says Myers, Oregon J., Aug. 2, 1919, at 1, 2.

26.

See Postmaster Yields to Legion’s Demand, Portland Oregonian, Aug.
28, 1919, at 9 (noting that “Postmaster Myers will restore ex-service men
to their former positions in the Portland postoffice” as part of his “promise
to the employment committee of the American Legion”). Lost in the
commotion was one important aspect of the dispute: the returning
veterans had been assigned to night duty because, according to Myers, it
would be inappropriate to switch the women who had been hired to
replace them during the war off the day shift. See No Promise Given,
Declares Myers, Oregon J., Aug. 4, 1919, at 1 (noting that Myers’s
explanation for declining to switch the women off the day shift was due
to “thugs and thieves” that infested Portland under the Mayor’s “rotten”
administration).

27.

See Democrats Hoping Myers Loses Scalp, Portland Oregonian, Aug.
17, 1919, at 19 (noting that many of those prominent in the Democratic
Party held the opinion that “Myers is a liability rather than an asset to
the party”).

28.

Letter from First Assistant Postmaster General J.C. Koons to Hon. F.S.
Myers (Jan. 27, 1920) [hereinafter Myers Resignation Demand Letter],
reprinted in S. Doc. No. 69-174, supra note 10, at 6–7.
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against him.29 Nothing happened during the remainder of the Wilson
administration, although he had a brief but unsuccessful meeting with
President Harding’s Postmaster General, Will Hays, in April 1921.30
Several days later, Myers filed suit in the U.S. Court of Claims for the
salary he would have earned had he remained in office for the balance
of his term.31 He lost there in 1923.32 Myers died in December 1924, but
his widow continued the litigation in the name of his estate.33 And, as
noted at the outset, the Supreme Court upheld the removal in 1926.

II. WOODROW WILSON
In removing Myers as Portland’s postmaster, the Wilson administration ignored the applicable statute, which had been on the books
for about half a century.34 That statute provided that local postmasters
like Myers “shall be appointed and may be removed by the President
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”35 A chief executive
who wanted to remove a postmaster simply sent the name of a new
nominee to the Senate; confirmation of the successor amounted to
consent to the removal of the incumbent. President Wilson surely could
have chosen that course to get rid of Myers, but, for whatever reason,
he decided to defy the statute and risk a constitutional confrontation.
In this Part, I will consider several possible explanations for bypassing
the statute.

29.

See, e.g., Telegram from Frank S. Myers to Hon. A.S. Burleson (Feb. 2,
1920), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 69-174, supra note 10, at 7; Mr. Myers
to Take Appeal to Senate, Portland Oregonian, Feb. 5, 1920, at 11;
Postmaster Myers Says Chamberlain Is Doing Him Injustice, Oregon J.,
Feb. 5, 1920, at 3; Myers Eager to Reply to All Charges, Portland
Telegram, Feb. 14, 1920, at 13.

30.

See F.S. Myers, Ousted Postmaster, Given Hearing by Hays, Oregon J.,
Apr. 22, 1921, at 1; Ousted Postmaster Interviews Hays, Portland
Oregonian, Apr. 23, 1921, at 1.

31.

See Myers Sues for Salary, Portland Oregonian, Apr. 26, 1921, at 6.

32.

Myers v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 199 (1923), aff’d, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).

33.

After her husband’s death, Lois Myers became an editorial writer and
columnist for Portland newspapers. See Journal’s Original Mr. Fixit Dies
at 80; Retired in 1949, Oregon J., Sept. 30, 1956, at A11; Mrs. Lois
Myers, Portland Oregonian, Sept. 30, 1956, at 40.

34.

I refer to the Wilson administration rather than to President Wilson
because the chief executive was recovering from a stroke at this time.
Therefore, it is not entirely clear to what extent he was engaged in dayto-day decisionmaking during this period.

35.

Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, § 6, 19 Stat. 78, 80–81. This provision was
carried over from the Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 63, 17 Stat. 283, 292–93.
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A. Exigent Circumstances

If Frank Myers was engaged in criminal or unethical conduct, the
Post Office Department would have had good reason to remove him
from office as quickly as possible. As noted earlier, Chief Justice
Rehnquist has said Myers was suspected of committing fraud.36 That
seems unlikely, however. Myers was never charged with any crime. The
letter from Washington demanding his resignation cited only personal
conflicts within the Portland post office.37 Perhaps the postal
authorities were more concerned with removing Myers than imprisoning
him, but local newspapers that often reported political gossip contained
no intimation that he was suspected of criminal wrongdoing.
Whatever the grounds for ousting Myers, it is difficult to believe
that the administration could not have persuaded the Senate to
acquiesce. All the Senate had to do was confirm Wilson’s nominee to
succeed Myers, which was the standard practice in postmaster removals
under the statute.
To be sure, the process might have become a bit more cumbersome
as a result of Wilson’s 1917 extension of civil service procedures to local
postmasterships, which previously had been handled as patronage
appointments.38 Perhaps the new rules would have required an initial
Senate vote agreeing with the chief executive’s desire to remove Myers
before the necessary examination could be prepared and administered
to potential successors. Even so, it is difficult to believe that the Senate
would have objected to declaring a vacancy if there was good reason to
believe that Myers had disrupted his operation as completely as the
36.

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

37.

See Myers Resignation Demand Letter, supra note 28.

38.

See Exec. Order No. 2569A (Mar. 31, 1917). This order extended civil
service procedures to first-, second-, and third-class postmasters, but it
did not apply to incumbents. The Portland office was a first-class
postmastership. Wilson’s order has been described as “almost his sole
contribution to the extension of merit principles,” Paul P. Van Riper,
History of the United States Civil Service 239 (1958), a surprising
statement about a man who had been a vice-president of the National
Civil Service Reform League before entering the White House. Id. at 230.
President Taft had tried to extend civil service protection to incumbent
fourth-class postmasters, see Exec. Order No. 1624 (Oct. 15, 1912), but
Wilson quickly withdrew the protections from incumbents while providing
that all new fourth-class postmasters would be chosen through civil
service, see Exec. Order No. 1776 (May 7, 1913). Ironically, Myers
opposed Wilson’s 1917 order (which did not apply to him because he was
an incumbent) because it would adversely affect local Democratic political
organizations; so did numerous congressional Democrats. See Letter from
Frank S. Myers to Hon. Daniel C. Roper (Mar. 10, 1917); Civil Service
Order Angers Congressmen, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1917, at 7; Fight Civil
Service Order, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1917, at 5. There is no reason to
believe that his opposition had anything to do with his later difficulties.
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Post Office Department claimed. The likelihood of Senate approval had
to have been even greater if, as Chief Justice Rehnquist hypothesized,
Myers was suspected of corruption.
Whatever the urgency of getting Myers out of the way, then, it
cannot explain why the statutory removal procedure had to be avoided.
At most, the exigency provided a rationale for rejecting that procedure.
B. Democratic Factionalism

Another possible explanation for Wilson’s decision to ignore the
statutory removal provision was that he wanted to punish Myers for
being aligned with his Democratic critics. Because those critics were in
the Senate, they might have blocked an attempt to remove a postmaster
whom one of their number had sponsored. On this reasoning, trying to
cut the upper house out of the removal process seems like a sound
strategy. That is an understandable hypothesis, but the available evidence makes it highly implausible.
Recall that Myers’s political mentor was Harry Lane, for whom he
served as 1912 campaign manager and later as personal secretary.39
Although elected as a strong supporter of Wilson, Lane opposed the
President’s 1917 proposal to arm U.S. merchant ships. That proposal
was blocked by a Senate filibuster at the end of the Sixty-fourth
Congress, which led Wilson to denounce the “little group of willful men,
representing no opinion but their own.”40 Lane also opposed the
declaration of World War I.41 So Wilson had good reason to seek retribution against someone who owed his position to Lane, but striking
back at Myers in 1920 seems a dubious way to make the point.
One problem with this explanation is that Harry Lane had been
dead for almost three years when Myers was unilaterally removed from
his position.42 It would take a remarkable political memory to wait that
long to go after a critic’s protégé. Long memories are legion in politics,
but in this instance the administration could have gotten rid of Myers
much sooner. Myers’s first term as postmaster expired in 1917, just
about the time that Lane died. Wilson could have selected someone else
at that point. The replacement would have had to go through the new
civil service procedures, which were announced less than a month before
39.

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

40.

See Franklin L. Burdette, Filibustering in the Senate 122–23
(Russel & Russel, Inc. 1965) (1940) (noting that Senator Lane was one of
the eleven senators who faced severe public criticism for opposing Wilson’s
proposal); Dodds, American Northwest, supra note 11, at 199; Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace
360, 362 (1965); Thomas W. Ryley, A Little Group of Willful
Men 32–33, 78, 119, 143–44 (1975).

41.

See Dodds, American Northwest, supra note 11, at 199; MacColl,
supra note 23, at 137; Ryley, supra note 40, at 165.

42.

See MacColl, supra note 23, at 137; Ryley, supra note 40, at 170–71.
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Myers’s term ended, but this complication should not have discouraged
the replacement of an incumbent postmaster who had drawn
administration ire. Besides, Myers was a strong Wilson supporter who
had assisted in his 1916 reelection effort.43
Another possibility is that Myers was forced out at the behest of
Oregon’s other Democratic Senator, George Chamberlain. There is
ample reason to believe that Chamberlain had no use for Myers. The
Portland postmaster had been severely critical of the senator, so much
so that he was rumored to be seriously considering a primary challenge
in 1920.44 The main problem with this hypothesis is that Chamberlain
was on terrible terms with the Wilson administration. Although (unlike
Lane) he supported the war, Chamberlain had strongly condemned
military inefficiency and had publicly aligned himself with Theodore
Roosevelt and other Wilson critics on the issue.45 Worse yet,
Chamberlain favored the Lodge reservations to the Versailles treaty,
which by itself was likely to put him beyond the pale.46 Myers went out
of his way to bring the Chamberlain faction’s disloyalty to the White
House’s attention.47 Although Wilson made some overtures to mend the
breach,48 in the end he refused to support Chamberlain for reelection in
1920.49 Even if getting rid of Myers seemed like a small gesture of
reconciliation before the final break came, that would not explain
Wilson’s defiance of the statutory removal procedure. Indeed,
challenging the Senate’s role in postmaster removals would have been
counterproductive if the goal had been to conciliate Chamberlain by
dismissing his nemesis. Presumably the senator would have been
delighted to lead the fight against Myers on Capitol Hill.
Here again, then, we can see why party considerations might have
prompted the administration to rid itself of Myers. This cannot explain
why the strategy included a unilateral removal in the face of the
provision for senatorial approval.

43.

See, e.g., Letter from Frank S. Myers to Hon. Thos. R. Marshall (Jan. 3,
1916) (indicating that Myers would be “very glad” to circulate political
petitions for Wilson and his Vice President, Thomas Marshall).

44.

See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.

45.

See Burton, supra note 11, at 42; Seward W. Livermore, Politics
Is Adjourned 81–90 (1966); Avery, supra note 17, at 41–45, 53–54, 59–
62, 64–65, 70–84, 86–88.

46.

See Burton, supra note 11, at 42; Avery, supra note 17, at 92.

47.

See, e.g., Letter from Frank S. Myers to Hon. W. G. McAdoo (Jan. 30,
1916); Letter from Frank S. Myers to Hon. J.P. Tumulty (Feb. 16, 1918).

48.

See President Seeks Chamberlain’s Aid, Portland Oregonian, July 17,
1919, at 1 (describing an amicable meeting between Chamberlain and Wilson).

49.

See Burton, supra note 11, at 43–44; Avery, supra note 17, at 92–93.
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C. Longstanding Political Philosophy

Yet another conceivable explanation for Wilson’s decision to provoke a constitutional fight over the removal procedure is a deep-seated
intellectual aversion to mechanisms that weaken presidential power.
Wilson made his mark as one of the first scholars of American
government, so perhaps we can find evidence for this hypothesis in his
writings. Wilson’s most comprehensive work was Congressional Government, which was published in 1885.50 He primarily emphasized the
dominance of standing committees in the House and Senate but noted
the institutional weakness of the presidency.51 In that regard, he had a
few critical words to say about the Tenure of Office Act, which was
still on the books at the time. He characterized the law as a
“usurpation” of executive power that is “repugnant . . . to the original
theory of the Constitution” but went on immediately to discount its
significance in light of the emergence of the civil service as the primary
means for filling federal jobs.52 Later he lamented that the statute also
meant that the chief executive “[could not] dismiss his advisers without
legislative consent” but quickly added that, in reality, these aides
served Congress rather than the President and that the entire
arrangement was “a hopeless undertaking.”53 In a 1900 preface to the
fifteenth printing, Wilson approvingly noted the repeal of the Tenure
of Office Act and confessed that he failed to consider that the law had
“[fallen] into the background” after the Johnson impeachment.54
Although Wilson plainly disliked the Tenure of Office Act, he
regarded the law more as a nuisance than as a serious factor in the
weakness of the presidency. In later years, when he took a more
optimistic view of the executive and wrote about the prospects for
effective presidential leadership, Wilson said nothing about the Tenure
50.

See Robert L. Peabody, Afterword to Congressional Government: A
Study in American Politics 217 (Johns Hopkins paperback ed. 1981)
(“none of [Wilson’s] books was to rival Congressional Government in
importance or impact.”).

51.

See generally Niels Aage Thorsen, The Political Thought of
Woodrow Wilson 41–67 (1988) (describing Wilson’s view of the president as “an almost pitiful figure, selected at a nominating convention by
procedures and for reasons that almost guarantee the nominee’s inability
to exercise leadership in case of election”); Peabody, supra note 50, at 216
(noting Wilson’s writings regarding the power struggle between Congress
and the President); Roland Young, Wilson’s Congressional Government
Reconsidered, in The Philosophy and Policies of Woodrow Wilson
201 (Earl Latham ed., 1958) (noting Wilson’s early work criticizing the
structure of Congress).

52.

Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government 49 (The Riverside
Press Cambridge 1925) (1885).

53.

Id. at 277.

54.

Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government, at vii (15th ed. 1900).
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of Office Act.55 We should not exaggerate the significance of that
omission, however, because the offending statute had been repealed two
decades earlier56 and had no prospects for resuscitation. At most, this
suggests only that Wilson was not preoccupied by the subject. That in
turn implies that he did not precipitate a constitutional clash over the
Myers removal out of a longstanding desire to make a philosophical or
jurisprudential point.
One other fact strongly supports this conclusion. Myers was fired
just short of seven years into Wilson’s presidency.57 That is hardly the
time to expect him to stamp out a blatantly unconstitutional statute
that he regarded as substantially undermining his authority. To be sure,
postmasters were not the highest priority in the grand scheme of
presidential activity, but the postmaster law covered more than 10,000
offices, hardly a trivial number.58 Perhaps even more telling, if he really
objected in principle to the law, Wilson could easily have raised the
issue at the outset of his first term, when he removed scores of
postmasters who had been appointed by his Republican predecessors.
Yet he never did so. Instead, he followed the procedure set out in the
postmaster statute and sought Senate consent to removals. Indeed, on
the very day he nominated Frank Myers in 1913, Wilson sought to
remove another postmaster by submitting the name of a proposed
successor to the Senate for confirmation.59
Despite Wilson’s aversion to sharing his removal power with the
Senate, then, there is no reason to believe that he deliberately provoked
this fight to vindicate some long-held view of presidential authority.
D. Frustration with Congress

An alternative explanation, one that relies less on Wilson’s
longstanding intellectual commitments and more on his experience in
office, suggests that he picked a constitutional fight over the Myers
55.

See Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United
States 54–81 (1908) (discussing the presidency).

56.

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

57.

See Myers Resignation Demand Letter, supra note 28.

58.

See William Dudley Foulke, Fighting the Spoilsmen 257 (1919);
Daniel D. Stid, The President as Statesman 137 (1998). By way of
comparison, there were more than 50,000 fourth-class postmasters. See
Foulke, supra, at 233. Indeed, the enormous patronage opportunities
presented by postmasterships was one factor in the Wilson administration’s reluctance to put these positions under strict civil service procedures. See 4 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life and
Letters 43–50 (1931); Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom
158–60 (1956); Van Riper, supra note 38, at 238; From the Diary of
Josephus Daniels (Mar. 7, 1913), 27 The Papers of Woodrow Wilson
160 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1978).

59.

See 50 Cong. Rec. 199 (1913).
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removal because he saw many legislative encroachments on his
prerogatives during his White House years. There is no direct evidence
for this hypothesis, and Wilson’s physical incapacities during his final
seventeen months in office suggest a cautious approach to inferring too
much about his direct involvement in decisionmaking, but the available
record makes this explanation plausible.
Wilson’s difficulties with the Senate over the League of Nations and
the Versailles treaty are well known and need not be rehearsed in detail.
These difficulties capped a long series of conflicts between the
administration and Congress, however. Many of the earlier problems
also related to diplomatic and military matters. For example, soon after
the First World War began, Wilson proposed that the United States
purchase merchant vessels of belligerent nations that were marooned in
American ports due to the war at sea; Congress rejected this measure
early in 1915 despite vigorous administration lobbying.60 Early the
following year, Congress seriously considered a resolution to withdraw
American protection of U.S. citizens traveling on vessels of combatant
nations; Wilson strenuously opposed this measure, which ultimately
was rejected, because he thought it undercut his own diplomatic
efforts.61
The most significant prewar conflict between Wilson and Congress
related to his proposal to arm U.S. merchant ships as a last-ditch way
of defending American neutrality. Following the 1916 election, Wilson
made this proposal to the lame-duck congressional session.62 The House
voted in favor, but the measure died in the Senate as the result of a
filibuster that lasted until noon on March 4, when the Sixty-fourth
Congress expired.63 Wilson was outraged by this senatorial
obstreperousness, denouncing the “little group of willful men” who had
prevented the legislature from functioning.64 He announced that he
60.

See Burdette, supra note 40, at 103–15; Arthur S. Link, Wilson:
The Struggle for Neutrality 81–91 (1960); Ryley, supra note 40,
at 42–44.

61.

See Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises 167–94 (1964);
Livermore, supra note 45, at 7; Ryley, supra note 40, at 47–52.

62.

See Burdette, supra note 40, at 115 (“The short session of the 64th
Congress came to an end on March 4, 1917 . . . With the end of the session
died the President’s prewar measure to arm merchant vessels, the Armed
Ship Bill.”).

63.

Ryley, supra note 40, at 92 (“The House passed the Armed Ship Bill on
the afternoon of March 1.”); Link, supra note 40, at 346–70 (“Republican
senators met in caucus on that same day and agreed unanimously to
filibuster against the vital appropriations bill in order to force the
President to call a special session of Congress soon after the expiration of
the Sixty-fourth Congress on March 4.”).

64.

See Burdette, supra note 40, at 115–23; Link, supra note 40, at 346–70;
Ryley, supra note 40, at 94–131.
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would call the new Sixty-fifth Congress into special session to act on
the armed-ship bill but insisted that the Senate first take steps to limit
debate; this resulted in the adoption of a rule providing for cloture.65 In
the end, Wilson was able to arm the merchant ships without
congressional action.66 Within weeks, the dispute was superseded by
events as the nation found itself officially at war. Still, it is clear that
the armed-ship filibuster left a lasting impression on the chief executive.
Two other developments support the view that Wilson was becoming increasingly sensitive to presidential prerogative. First, in early
February 1920, he demanded and received the resignation of Secretary
of State Robert Lansing for disloyalty.67 It is true that Lansing was
forced out after Myers was dismissed, but Wilson first learned of
Lansing’s breach while in Portland to deliver a speech on September
15, 1919, during his barnstorming tour to rally support for the League
of Nations.68 Under the circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that the
ability to remove executive officials had become a matter of some
salience at that point and that protecting that ability from
congressional encroachment might well have taken on high priority.
This possibility receives greater support from Wilson’s veto of the
Budget and Accounting Act in June 1920 over the procedure for
removing the Comptroller General. The bill as passed provided that the
Comptroller could be dismissed, other than by impeachment, only
through a concurrent resolution of Congress,69 a device that completely
excludes the President because it is not presented to the chief executive
for approval or veto. Wilson specifically cited the removal provision as
the sole basis for rejecting the bill, which dealt with a reform he
professed to support and which he had endorsed early in his
administration.70
65.

See Sarah A. Binder & Steven S. Smith, Politics or Principle?
78–79 (1997); Burdette, supra note 40, at 127–28; Link, supra note 40,
at 370; Ryley, supra note 40, at 147–49. Needless to say, the new Senate
rule did not eliminate filibusters. See Binder & Smith, supra, at 6–19,
85–92, 129–53.

66.

See Link, supra note 40, at 372–77; Ryley, supra note 40, at 149–50.

67.

See Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing (Feb. 11, 1920), in
64 The Papers of Woodrow Wilson 404 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1991);
Letter from Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson (Feb. 12, 1920), in 64
The Papers of Woodrow Wilson 408 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1991).

68.

See Clifford W. Trow, “Something Desperate in His Face”: Woodrow
Wilson in Portland at the “Very Crisis of His Career,” 82 Or. Hist. Q.
41, 48 (1981).

69.

59 Cong. Rec. 8609 (1920).

70.

For the veto message, see 59 Cong. Rec. 8609–10 (1920). On the
background to the bill, see Harvey C. Mansfield, The Comptroller
General 65–69 (1939); Frederick C. Mosher, The GAO: The Quest
for Accountability in American Government 43–55 (1979)

1072

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 4·2015
The Curious Case of the Pompous Postmaster

Although we cannot know for certain, this series of conflicts with
Congress seems the most likely explanation for the Wilson administration’s decision to stand on principle in connection with the Myers
dismissal. No other explanation can adequately account for the White
House’s refusal to go to the Senate for the removal of an obscure
postmaster whose ouster almost certainly would have been approved
on Capitol Hill.

III. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT
When the Myers case reached the Supreme Court, the government
argued for a kind of middle ground: Congress could not reserve a formal
place for itself in the removal process but might set standards governing
removals by the President.71 Chief Justice Taft rejected this course and
concluded that the chief executive must have unfettered authority in
this field.72 It is often suggested that the breadth of the opinion can be
explained by the uniqueness of Taft’s experience: he was, after all, the
only person ever to serve both in the White House and on the Supreme
Court.73 Justice Frankfurter recognized this view in Wiener v. United
States,74 which read Myers narrowly to find an implicit limitation on
presidential removal authority for members of the War Claims
Commission.75
This superficially attractive explanation is inadequate for several
reasons. For one thing, Taft had no reason to vindicate Woodrow
[hereinafter Mosher, GAO]; Frederick C. Mosher, A Tale of Two
Agencies 27–31 (1984) [hereinafter Mosher, Tale]; Darrell Hevenor
Smith, The General Accounting Office 58–61 (1927); Roger R.
Trask, Defender of the Public Interest 24–38 (1996). After
Wilson’s veto was sustained, Congress the following year modified the
removal procedure to require a joint resolution, which was presented to
the President, and President Harding signed what became known as the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. See Mansfield, supra, at 69–70;
Mosher, GAO, supra, at 55–56; Mosher, Tale, supra, at 31–32; Smith,
supra, at 62; Trask, supra, at 38–42. The revised removal provision was
rejected in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
71.

See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 96 (argument of Solicitor General
Beck); Brief for the United States on Reargument, reprinted in S. Doc.
No. 69-174, supra note 10, at 69–71.

72.

Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at 106, 176.

73.

See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The President’s Removal Power
Under the Constitution 50 (1927); William E. Leuchtenburg, The
Supreme Court Reborn 65 (1995); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power
and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 Yale L.J. 451, 476 (1979); Peter L.
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 610 (1984).

74.

357 U.S. 349 (1958).

75.

Id. at 351–52.
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Wilson, the President who fired Myers. After all, Taft had been humiliatingly defeated by Wilson when he sought reelection in 1912, carrying
only two states and finishing third in the popular vote.76
Moreover, the argument that Taft objected to the postmaster
statute because he previously served as chief executive ignores his
behavior as President: Taft sought to remove at least 175 postmasters
during his White House tenure and never once objected to the statutory
requirement of senatorial consent.77 It turns out that President Taft
scrupulously complied with the statute throughout his four years in
office.78 As far as I have been able to determine, he never objected to
the requirement of senatorial consent to the removal of postmasters.
When the Senate failed to act the first time he proposed to dismiss a
postmaster, Taft routinely resubmitted the name of his preferred
alternative.79 Nor did Taft protest when the Senate three times refused
to go along with his proposal to oust John G. Gorth as postmaster of
Oconomowoc, Wisconsin, and replace him with W.A. Jones.80
Skepticism about the vulgar realist explanation for Taft’s opinion
is further warranted by his distaste for deciding postal personnel
matters. In 1912 he tried to place all fourth-class postmasters under
civil service.81 Then, in a book he wrote between his presidency and his
chief justiceship, Taft grumped:
I cannot exaggerate the waste of the President’s time and the
consumption of his nervous vitality involved in listening to
Congressmen’s intercession as to local appointments. Why should
the President have his time taken up in a discussion over the

76.

Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Road to the White House 525 (1965).

77.

Jonathan L. Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit: Form,
Substance, and Administrative Independence, 75 Ky. L.J. 699, 736 n.166
(1987).

78.

See, e.g., 48 Cong. Rec. 9239 (1912) (seeking consent to remove and
replace postmasters in Illinois, Kentucky, and Minnesota); 45 Cong. Rec.
62 (1909) (seeking consent to remove and replace postmasters in
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and West Virginia).

79.

See, e.g., 48 Cong. Rec. 86 (1911) (resubmitting the name of James S.
Byrd to be postmaster of Jonesboro, Tennessee, after Senate previously
adjourned without voting on Byrd’s nomination to replace incumbent
postmaster Frank E. Britton).

80.

The Senate never voted on the removal of Gorth and his replacement by
Jones. See 46 Cong. Rec. 73 (1910); 47 Cong. Rec. 54 (1911); 48 Cong.
Rec. 87 (1911).

81.

See supra note 38.
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question of who shall be postmistress at the town of Devil’s Lake
in North Dakota?82

He added that all executive branch personnel below the rank of cabinet
secretaries and a single undersecretary in each department should be
put under civil service.83 This hardly sounds like a defense of sweeping
presidential prerogative.
In fact, Taft had a more complex view of the office. Although he
did not believe in an activist chief executive, he wanted to protect
presidential prerogatives in those areas. Moreover, this was not a view
that he came to only after serving in the White House. Thirty-five years
before Myers and nearly two decades before his election as President,
Taft argued for an expansive view of the removal power. As Solicitor
General in 1891, Taft defended President Cleveland’s removal of an
Alaska territorial official.84 In the same year, he advised the Treasury
Department that it had broad power to dismiss a politically disloyal
customs officer.85
Ironically, it appears that it was Taft rather than Wilson who had
a longstanding aversion to limitations on presidential removal authority. When the opportunity finally arose, Taft seems to have seized it to
write his broad view into constitutional doctrine.

IV. MYERS AS PRECEDENT AND AS SYMBOL
Initially Myers was thought to have made clear that the President
has unfettered power to remove all nonjudicial civilian appointed
officials. This view was reflected in two different ways during the years
immediately following that ruling. First, the statutes creating the
Federal Power Commission in 193086 and both the Federal
Communications Commission87 and the Securities and Exchange
82.

William Howard Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers
67 (1916).

83.

See id. at 70–71.

84.

See McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174 (1891). Ironically, a major
part of Taft’s argument was that the removal fell within an exception to
the Tenure of Office Act, which was still in force when the official was
ousted. See id. at 177–78.

85.

See Alpheus Thomas Mason, William Howard Taft: Chief Justice
254 (1965) (quoting Letter from William Howard Taft to A.L. Spaulding
(July 23, 1891)).

86.

Act of June 23, 1930, ch. 572, 46 Stat. 797 (amended by Department of
Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 401, 91 Stat. 565, 582–83
(reorganizing and renaming the agency as the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission)).

87.

Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 4, 48 Stat. 1064, 1066–68 (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 154 (2012)).
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Commission in 193488 were silent with respect to removal, thereby
reflecting the view that Myers had resolved the removal issue in favor
of the President.89
Second, Solicitor General Stanley Reed, having been advised to
select a sure winner as the first case he would present in the Supreme
Court, chose the seemingly safe argument that the statutory requirement that the President could remove a member of the Federal Trade
Commission only for cause was unconstitutional on the basis of Myers.90
Reed’s approach seemed reasonable, as Myers had been decided only
nine years earlier, but it proved to be a colossal miscalculation: the
Court unanimously upheld the for-cause provision in Humphrey’s
Executor v. United States.91 The Court reasoned that the FTC was an
independent agency and that Myers applied only to “purely executive”
offices.92
The retreat from the broadest implications of Myers continued two
decades later in Wiener v. United States,93 which relied on Humphrey’s
Executor to read a for-cause requirement into the statute that created
the War Claims Commission.94 A unanimous Court explained that
officials who were charged with deciding claims “‘according to law’” 95
could not function with “the Damocles’ sword of removal by the
President” hanging over them.96
Although Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener limited the broadest
language in Myers, that ruling has retained its vitality at least to the
extent that the Supreme Court continues to reaffirm that Congress
itself may not formally participate in the removal of officials exercising
executive power. Notably, in Bowsher v. Synar,97 the Court invalidated
a provision of a statute that authorized the Comptroller General to
88.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 4, 48 Stat. 881, 885 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2012)).

89.

See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 546–47 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the result of the
Myers decision was to “cast serious doubt on the constitutionality of all
‘for cause’ removal provisions”). The Court decided Free Enterprise Fund
on the “understanding,” based on the parties’ agreement, that members
of the SEC were removable only for cause. Id. at 487 (opinion of the Court).

90.

Leuchtenburg, supra note 73, at 64.

91.

295 U.S. 602 (1935).

92.

Id. at 627–28.

93.

357 U.S. 349 (1958).

94.

Id. at 353–54.

95.

Id. at 355 (quoting War Claims Act of 1948, ch. 826, § 3, 62 Stat 1240,
1241 (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 2002 (2012)).

96.

Id. at 356.

97.

478 U.S. 714 (1986).
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issue sequestration orders to reduce federal spending if the budget
deficit exceeded specified limits. The Court reasoned that Congress
could unilaterally dismiss the Comptroller General because that official
could be removed by a joint resolution—which meant both that only
Congress could initiate removal and that the legislative branch could
oust the Comptroller over the President’s objection by overriding the
chief executive’s veto of a joint resolution.98 This arrangement rendered
the Comptroller “subservient to Congress”99 and precluded him from
exercising any aspect of executive power.100 Even as it reaffirmed that
Congress could not formally participate in the process of removal,
however, the Bowsher Court explicitly declined to endorse the most
sweeping view of presidential power. The opinion contained a footnote
that disclaimed any suggestion that the ruling called into doubt the
constitutionality of independent agencies such as the Federal Trade
Commission, which had been at the heart of the dispute in Humphrey’s
Executor.101
Moreover, Myers was the focal point of the argument in Morrison
v. Olson,102 which upheld the independent counsel provisions of the
Ethics in Government Act103 against a challenge based in large part on
the statutory procedure for removing special prosecutors. Under the
Ethics in Government Act, the Attorney General was required to
conduct a preliminary investigation of information suggesting that
high-level executive officials had violated federal criminal laws. That
investigation could last no more than ninety days. If, at the end of this
period, the Attorney General found no reasonable grounds to believe
that a crime had been committed, the matter ended. Otherwise, the
Attorney General was required to refer the matter to a special court
that would appoint an independent counsel who could be removed only
by the Attorney General and only for good cause.104
The Court rejected the challenge to the removal procedure.
Reaffirming the Bowsher interpretation of Myers, Chief Justice
Rehnquist explained that the independent counsel law did not entail a
98.

Id. at 728 & n.7.

99.

Id. at 730.

100. Id. at 732. The Court had no difficulty in concluding that the functions
assigned to the Comptroller General under the statute were executive in
nature. Id. at 733.
101. Id. at 725 n.4 (observing that no statute gives Congress a formal role in
the removal of members of independent agencies).
102. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
103. Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867–75 (1978) (amended 1983,
1987, and 1994; expired 1999).
104. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660–65 (discussing the procedural steps
required by the Act).
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legislative effort to participate in the removal process: the Ethics Act
“puts the removal power squarely in the hands of the Executive
Branch”;105 only the Attorney General, an executive officer who is
directly accountable to the President, could remove an independent
counsel. Accordingly, the arrangement was analogous to that in
Humphrey’s Executor and therefore quite different from those in Myers
or in Bowsher, where Congress itself had a formal role in the removal
of an official who exercised executive power.106 Moreover, the Court
declined to focus on whether the independent counsel was a “purely
executive” officer, expressing its “present considered view”107 that the
removal arrangements did not “unduly trammel[] on executive
authority.”108
This analysis provoked an apoplectic dissent from Justice Scalia,
who lamented the demise of what he called “our former constitutional
system.”109 Explicitly reaffirming Myers110 while criticizing Humphrey’s
Executor,111 Scalia specifically invoked the Watergate special prosecutor
to illustrate what he viewed as an acceptable political response to
allegations of executive wrongdoing.112 A closer look at the institutional
arrangements relating to the Watergate special prosecutor in the Nixon
tapes case suggests that Justice Scalia’s invocation of those
arrangements as preferable to those in the independent counsel law
might have overlooked an important feature that was never mentioned
by either the parties or the Court in United States v. Nixon.113
By way of background, Leon Jaworski, who litigated the tapes case,
was the second Watergate special prosecutor. The first special
prosecutor, Archibald Cox, was dismissed on orders of President Nixon.
The gravity of the situation was reflected in the resignations on
principle of Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy Attorney
General William Ruckelshaus, both of whom refused direct orders to
fire Cox. Faced with what his own aides described as a “firestorm” of
criticism that badly undermined his credibility following what became

105. Id. at 686.
106. Id. (drawing an analogy to Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and
distinguishing Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714, and Myers v. United States, 277
U.S. 52 (1926)).
107. Id. at 689.
108. Id. at 691.
109. Id. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 723.
111. Id. at 725–26.
112. Id. at 711.
113. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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known as the Saturday Night Massacre,114 Nixon had to acquiesce in
the appointment of Jaworski as the new special prosecutor. Whatever
we might think about the arrangements for removing an independent
counsel under the Ethics Act, the procedure for removing the
Watergate special prosecutor should have raised constitutional alarms
to anyone who took Myers—even as it had been qualified in Humphrey’s
Executor and Wiener—seriously as a precedent.
As noted above, an independent counsel could be removed only by
the Attorney General—not by the President—and only for cause. The
Watergate special prosecutor, on the other hand, could be removed by
the President—but only for “extraordinary improprieties” and even
then only after the chief executive’s “first consulting the Majority and
the Minority Leaders and Chairmen and ranking Minority Members of
the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives
and ascertaining that their consensus is in accord with [the President’s]
proposed action.”115 The Supreme Court quoted this regulation in a
footnote in Nixon but attached no substantive significance to the
removal mechanism.116
In other words, the President had to obtain the effective approval
of congressional leaders before removing Jaworski as Watergate special
prosecutor. This was precisely the vice that led the Court to invalidate
the procedure for removing postmasters in Myers. If anything, the
problem in the Watergate case was more egregious, because only a
handful of legislators rather than one or both houses of Congress had
to consent to the dismissal of the special prosecutor.
Perhaps this provision was overlooked because President Nixon’s
lawyers did not attack the requirement of congressional approval of the
removal of the special prosecutor. It is not as though Nixon’s lawyers
ignored Myers. Their brief on the merits invoked that precedent as
exemplifying the centrality of separation of powers and supporting the
notion that the President is immune from compulsory process.117 The
brief went on to mention, almost in passing, that “the specific holding
of the Myers case was narrowed to some extent” in a subsequent case,
although “that narrowing was on a point that does not bear on the
present issue.”118
From a contemporary perspective, this seems like a legal gaffe.
After all, Myers held that requiring Senate consent for the removal of
114. Elizabeth Drew, Washington Journal: The Events of 1973–1974,
at 66 (1975); see also Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate:
The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon 411 (1990).
115. 38 Fed. Reg. 30738, 30739 (1973).
116. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 694–95 n.8.
117. Brief. for the Respondent and Cross-Petitioner Richard M. Nixon,
President of the United States, at 73, Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
118. Id. at 74 (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935))
(emphasis added).
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a postmaster unconstitutionally impinged on presidential power. The
subsequent case to which Nixon’s brief referred was Humphrey’s
Executor v. United States. But the regulation requiring the President
to consult with and obtain consensus approval from the leadership of
both houses of Congress before discharging the Watergate special
prosecutor goes well beyond the cause requirement upheld in
Humphrey’s Executor and might pose even greater constitutional problems than the postmaster provision that Myers rejected. In Myers the
full Senate had to act, whereas the Watergate regulation empowered a
handful of influential Senators and Representatives to prevent the
President from discharging the special prosecutor.
I do not raise this example to fault anyone: the Supreme Court,
President Nixon and his able lawyers, or Justice Scalia. Maybe the
details about removing the special prosecutor got lost in the way that
Myers was perceived. The strong theory of the unitary executive did
not emerge with full force until the presidency of Ronald Reagan,
almost a decade after Nixon’s resignation.119 The notion of an unfettered
removal power in the President is a central facet of the unitary
executive theory.120 At the same time, some proponents of a strong
presidency have not relied on the removal power to support their
position and count themselves as skeptical of the unitary executive
theory.121 Whatever the explanation, the Watergate tapes case should
remind us about the variability and ultimate contingency of many legal
concepts.

***
Myers was a most curious case. A minor personnel flap became the
vehicle for a constitutional collision whose ramifications are still being
fought over. That the case was unnecessary does not detract from its
significance. Frank Myers could have been fired according to the
119. See generally J. David Alvis, Jeremy D. Bailey & F. Flagg Taylor
IV, The Contested Removal Power, 1789–2010, 186–89 (2013)
(explaining how the Reagan administration utilized the theory of the
unitary executive).
120. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537
F.3d 667, 692–704 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), rev’d,
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statutory procedures, and the legal question could have been avoided
for another day. Woodrow Wilson had more important problems on his
agenda in 1920, and William Howard Taft need not have tried to resolve
the removal debate so definitively in 1926. But to say that the
principals could have behaved differently simply suggests that
Bismarck’s observation about legislation and sausage applies to
litigation as well.
Two last points might be worth noting. The first is ironic and
concerns one of the case’s participants. Frank Myers was represented
throughout the litigation by Will R. King, a longtime leader of the
progressive faction of the Oregon Democratic Party who, like Myers,
opposed the Chamberlain wing of the party.122 King went on to serve
on the Oregon Supreme Court. When he died in 1934, the newspaper
obituaries contained not a word about his role in the great Myers
case.123
Finally, it is apparent that the Supreme Court has not taken Chief
Justice Taft’s sweeping opinion in Myers at face value. The stakes of
the removal debate are far from clear, because Presidents rarely exercise
whatever removal authority they might have. The arguments here
really are proxies for larger disagreements concerning presidential
authority to oversee and direct the administration and implementation
of policy. In the end, Myers is important despite its oddities because of
the care and attention that the parties and the Court devoted to the
larger questions that the case raised.

122. See Burton, supra note 11, at 41.
123. See Will R. King, Ex-Justice of Oregon, Dead, Oregon J., June 3, 1934,
§ 1, at 2; William R. King Dead, Portland Oregonian, June 3, 1934,
§ 1, at 4.
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